Abstract. Distance bounding (DB) protocols allow one entity, the verifier, to securely obtain an upper-bound on the distance to another entity, the prover. Thus far, DB was considered mostly in the context of a single prover and a single verifier. There has been no substantial prior work on secure DB in group settings, where a set of provers interact with a set of verifiers. The need for group distance bounding (GDB) is motivated by many practical scenarios, including: group device pairing, location-based access control and secure distributed localization. This paper addresses, for the first time, one-way GDB protocols by utilizing a new passive DB primitive. We show how passive DB can be used to construct secure and efficient GDB protocols for various one-way GDB settings. We analyze the security and performance of proposed protocols and compare them with existing DB techniques extended to group settings.
Preliminaries
This section overviews DB protocols, formulates the GDB problem and presents our environmental assumptions.
Overview of Distance Bounding (DB)
Figure 1(a) shows a generic (Brands-Chaum-based) one-way DB protocol. The core of any distance bounding protocol is the distance measurement phase, in which the verifier measures a round-trip time between sending its challenge and receiving the prover's reply. The verifier's challenge is unpredictable and each reply needs to be computed as a function of the received challenge. Thus, the prover cannot reply before receiving a challenge. Consequently, it cannot pretend to be closer to the verifier than it really is (only further). First, the verifier and the prover each generate n b-bit nonces c i and r i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), respectively. In the Brands-Chaum DB protocol [3] , the prover also commits to its nonces using any secure commitment scheme. The verifier sends all c i to the prover, one at a time. Once each c i is received, the prover computes, and responds with a function of both nonces, f (c i , r i ). The verifier checks the reply and measures elapsed time between each challenge and response. The process is repeated n times and the protocol completes successfully only if all n rounds complete correctly. Prover's processing time: α = t P s − t P r must be negligible compared to time-of-flight; otherwise, a computationally powerful prover could claim a false bound. This time might be tolerably small, depending on the underlying technology, the distance measured and required security guarantees: less than 1nsec processing time yields 0.15m accuracy [17] .
Security of DB protocols relies on two assumptions: (1) verifier's challenges must be random and unpredictable, and (2) challenges traverse the distance between the two parties at maximum possible speed, i.e., the speed of electromagnetic waves. After running a DB protocol, the verifier knows that the distance to the prover is at most
where α is prover's processing time and c is the speed of light [3] . DB protocols typically require (2n + C) messages, where C is the number of messages exchanged in the pre-and post-processing protocol phases. Typically, C << n and can thus be ignored.
In some applications, e.g., distributed localization, there is a need for mutual DB between two parties: P 1 and P 2 . This can be achieved by modifying the one-way DB protocol such that each response from P 2 to a challenge by P 1 also includes a challenge from P 2 to P 1 (more details in [22] ). If prover authentication is required, public key signatures can be used to sign challenges and responses. The verifier validates the signature in the last step, as shown in Figure 1(a) . The protocol succeeds only if the signature is valid. Public key identification schemes, e.g., Schnorr or Fiat-Shamir can also be used, as described in [3] .
Problem Statement and System Model
We first present the general GDB problem statement and its variants, then describe our system and adversary models. 1-Distance Fraud Attack: A dishonest prover claims to be closer than it really is, aiming to shorten the distance to one or more verifiers. Note that a prover can always claim to be further by delaying responses.
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2-Mafia Fraud Attack: The adversary, posing as prover, interacts with the verifier. In parallel, it interacts with the actual prover posing as the verifier. The goal is to fool the verifier into believing that the adversary is the prover located closer to the verifier than the actual prover. We consider a GDB version of this attack where the adversary places one or more nodes between the prover(s) and one or more verifiers. The adversary aims to convince verifiers that these malicious nodes are real provers.
We assume that the DB protocols used in the construction of our GDB protocols are designed such that they prevent Distance Fraud and Mafia Fraud Attacks and further prevent Distance Hijacking attacks [9] . We do not consider Terrorist Fraud Attacks.
Passive DB
Whenever a prover and a verifier engage in a DB protocol, some information about their locations and mutual distance is leaked [13] . We use this observation in the presence of multiple verifiers and show that it is unnecessary for every verifier to directly interact with the prover (P ) to establish a DB to that prover. If at least one verifier (V a ) interacts with P , any other (passive) verifier (V p ) can deduce the DB between itself and P by observing messages between P and V a . We assume that V p and V a trust each other, know the distance separating them (or each other's locations) and both need to establish a DB to P . We address passive DB with untrusted verifiers in Section 5.3. Figure 1(b) shows V p observing the timings (T i ) of messages exchanged between P and V a . V p constructs three equations:
(1)
where α P and α Va are processing times of P and V a , respectively (ideally α P = 0) and t 0 is the protocol starting time. V p can determine time of flight for signals between P and V a thus computing the distance between them (where c denotes speed of light):
For V a (and V p ) to measure the distance between itself and P , α P must be negligible (or constant and known) 5 . Overview: V p uses time differences of arrival (TDoA) of three messages, its own and V a 's locations to construct the locus of P 's possible locations (a hyperbola, similar to other TDoA techniques [11] ). V p then determines the distance between V a and P (as shown in Equation 4) and constructs a circle with the radius of that distance. This circle intersects with P 's location locus at two points (s 1 and s 2 ). V p computes DB to P as the distance between itself and s 1 (or s 2 ) 6 . Passive DB Details: We show, among other things, that if P fools V p with a shorter-than-real passive DB, then the active DB established by V a must also be shortened. However, since V a 's DB can not be shortened, a passive DB is as secure as its active counterpart. Suppose V a and V p are located at (x a , y a ) and (x p , y p ), respectively. V p knows both of these locations and the distance d Va,Vp ). Without the loss of generality, we assume (x a , y a ) = (0, 0) to be the origin of the coordinate system. It follows that:
We further assume that P is at (x, y). V p also knows that:
If three messages in Figure 1( 
This yields the following formula for the locus of P 's possible location (on a hyperbola, due to TDoA [11] ):
Note that DB Va,P = d Va,P is an upper bound for the distance between P and V a . Using d Va,P , V p can construct another equation for the locus of P 's possible location (a circle around V a with radius d Va,P ):
V p can now establish a passive DB using the intersection of both loci (i.e., solving equations 11 and 10). The computed DB is the distance between V p 's own location (x p , y p ) and the intersection of P's loci described by equations 11 and 10. The end point of this DB (DB Vp,P = d Vp,P ) lies within a sector of a circle, not within the entire circle, as in the case of active DB. −7 ) is on one of several possible hyperbolas. The DB from V a at (0, 0) to P is shown as a circle around V a (labeled as Active Verifier) If P cheats, the circle drawn around V p at (0, 10) would intersect the hyperbola at a point ((−3, −1.5) in Figure 2(b) ), close to V p . This point would be inside the circle established by V a . However, the DB computed by V a would be shorter than the actual distance to P , which is impossible. If V p engages in a DB protocol with V a , it would obtain the circle shown around it in Figure 2(a) . However, in this passive case, it obtains a sector of that circle defined by the arc connecting two points ((−7, −7) and (7, −7)) where the computed hyperbola intersects the circle around V a . Section 2.1 shows that active DB prevents the distance fraud attack. Since passive DB is as secure as active DB, it also prevents the distance fraud attack. Adding authentication to passive DB prevents the mafia-fraud attack on passive DB since an attacker would be unable to authenticate itself to V p unless it also does so to V a . Both types of verifiers can use the same authentication mechanism, e.g., public key signatures (or public key identification schemes), as described in Section 2.1. All information (commitments, challenges, responses and signatures) required to authenticate provers also reaches passive verifiers. The only disadvantage is that V p does not generate its own challenges. Therefore, passive DB remains secure as long as active verifiers are trusted. We assume that the active DB protocol also prevents distance hijacking attacks.
One-Way DB extended to Group Settings
We focus on the most general one-way GDB case: M provers and N verifiers (MPNV). All other scenarios correspond to special cases. For comparison, we consider a GDB protocol where nodes sequentially engage in a naíve single prover single verifier DB. In each case, we propose an alternative approach based on passive DB. We assume that n rounds of DB are needed in all cases.
Setting Base Case # Messages Our Protocol # Messages
Base Case Time Our Protocol Time In a one-way MPNV setting, nodes act either as provers or as verifiers. In a naive MPNV protocol, each prover sequentially interacts with each verifier. This is repeated until all provers have interacted with all verifiers. The total number of messages is: (2n · N · M ) . In this context, there are two parameters to consider: (1) number of active and passive DB rounds performed by each verifier and (2) selection of active verifiers (i.e., deterministic or probabilistic). The second parameter does not affect how nodes act, however, it impacts security if verifiers are compromised (see Section 5) . Active verifiers can be selected at random or by any leader election protocol, e.g., [15] . The numbers of active verifiers and active rounds influence the number of messages required, the time to complete the protocol, the security of the DB. If all verifiers are treated equally, two parameters can describe a general protocol: (1) the number of active verifiers and (2) the number of active rounds by each verifier. If each verifier performs n rounds, let n a and n p (n a + n p = n) be the number of active and passive rounds, respectively. Let d a be the fraction of verifiers which perform n a active rounds. Each verifier has (d a · (N − 1) · n a ) opportunities to execute passive DB with each prover. Two interesting special cases are where (1) d a = 1/N and n a = n -one verifier interacts with all provers, and (2) d a = 1 and n a = n/N -all verifiers interact with all provers. By varying n a and d a , we can obtain a protocol with the required security level and fewer messages than in the sequential pairwise interaction. Table 2 compares number of messages in one-way GDB protocols based on passive DB to the base case of pairwise DB. Table 2 also shows total time required to compute all DBs. We compare with this base case since there are no prior GDB proposals. Our protocols require fewer messages and depend on the fraction of active verifiers and active rounds. MPNV requires (n a · d a ) messages. For example, with 60 nodes (30 provers and 30 verifiers) and d a = 0.8, 33% fewer messages are needed. Decreasing d a to 0.6 saves more than 55% of messages. Similar savings are also attainable for lower and higher numbers of provers/verifiers.
GDB Performance and Security Analysis

Performance
Security with Trusted Verifiers
The probability of a single prover successfully cheating a single verifier decreases exponentially with the number of DB rounds. For n rounds, a prover has 2 −n chance of successfully guessing all challenge bits and sending responses ahead of time. This tricks the verifier into measuring a shorter round trip time of flight 7 . An active verifier (V a ) does not need to trust any other entity. In a group setting, where each prover-verifier pair engages in an active DB protocol, these security guarantees still hold. However, active DB in a group setting is insecure if used for localization. When a prover interacts with each verifier separately, it can selectively lengthen its distance by delaying messages. Verifiers would then incorrectly localize the prover. Secure localization schemes must therefore require at least three verifiers that interact with the prover simultaneously.
Security Untrusted Active Verifiers
Passive DB with untrusted verifiers is mainly useful in MANETs, where nodes continuously encounter new peers. Passive DB is secure if each V a is trusted, as shown in Section 3. This is be the case in a fixed (or mobile) verification infrastructure with prior security association, or under control of one administrative entity. A malicious V a could undermine security of passive DB as follows:
(1) Report Fake Location (or Distance): V p requires the exact location of, or the distance to, V a in order to construct the DB, as shown in Section 3. V p will compute the hyperbola incorrectly (via Equation 10), if V a reports an incorrect location or distance.
(2) Sending Early Challenges: Even if V a reports its location or distance correctly, it can send new challenges prematurely. This would convince V p that the prover is closer than it actually is, as shown in Figure 1(b) . V p would then compute d Va,P , intersecting incorrectly with the hyperbola, as shown in Figure 2(a) , thus yielding a wrong DB.
We introduce a metric, DB Correctness (DBC), to illustrate the effectiveness of passive DB in the presence of such attacks:
where P r ch (V a ) is the fraction of rounds where V a cheats. If V a does not cheat at all, P r ch (V a ) = 0 and DBC = 1 − 2 −n . If V a cheats in all rounds, P r ch (V a ) = 1 and DBC = 0. Average correctness (DBC avg ) For a DB obtained by a V p to a specific prover (in case of N active verifiers: V a1 , V a2 ...V a N , each engaging in n 1 , n 2 ...n N rounds) average correctness (DBC avg ) can be computed as the average of individual DBC for each verifier:
For example, for 10 verifiers and 10 DB rounds, even if half of all V a -s cheat in half of their rounds, DB would be established correctly > 98% of the time. Also, as long as less than half of V a -s cheat in < 90% of rounds, DB would be correct > 70% of the time.
Combined Passive/Active DB Security
When a verifier performs n a active rounds and n p passive rounds both can be combined to obtain a more stable DB. We estimate the correctness in such a combined DB using a metric (DBC a/p ) as follows (note that both passive and active rounds have to result in the same DB):
If all other active verifiers cheat in all their DB rounds, DBC a/p becomes that of the active rounds performed by a verifier only, i.e., 1 − (2 −na ). Otherwise the correctness of the established DB increases with any additional passive round. As an example, consider the case of 10 verifiers. Even if only two rounds of active (n a ) DB are performed and as long as the fraction of rounds being cheated in is less than 1 correctness of the DB captured by DBC a/p increases. Even if the probability of cheating in passive DB rounds is as high as 0.5, DBC a/p will increase to over 0.95 if there are four or more opportunities to do passive DB.
Related Work
DB was introduced in [3] , as mentioned in Section 2.1. Several DB optimizations and studies were done subsequently. In particular, [13] studied information leakage in DB protocols as a privacy problem. [22] proposed a mutual DB protocol by interleaving challenges and responses; between a single prover and a single verifier. [20] , [19] and [5] investigated DB protocols in location verification and secure localization with three verifiers.
[18] investigated socalled "in-region verification" and claimed that, for certain applications (such as sensor networks and location-based access control) in-region verification is better than location determination. [8] and [6] considered collusion attacks on DB location verification protocols. Other work, such as [23] looked at using time difference of arrival (TDoA) to determine location of transmitters. [23] proposed using TDoA in the context of Ultra-Wideband (UWB). DB was implemented using commercial off-the-shelf electronic components [17] and commercial off-the-shelf UWB ranging devices [21, 14] . DB was also studied in the context of ad-hoc networks [22] , sensor networks [16, 5] and RFIDs [10, 12] .
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper presents the initial foray into group distance bounding (GDB). GDB is a fundamental mechanism for secure operation in wireless networks where verifying distances between, or locations of, groups of nodes is required. We investigated one-way GDB settings and constructed secure and efficient one-way GDB protocols. In doing so, we made minimal assumptions. However, there remain some open issues for future work, such as: (1) Can a passive verifier establish a DB without knowing the location of (or distance to) an active verifier, while perhaps knowing other information about distances to other nodes? (2) can passive DB be used to obtain mutual GDB protocols? (3) What can be done to address denial-of-service attacks in group settings (i.e., noisy environments)?
